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TEXT OF STATUTES

Rule 609(a), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) provides:
GENERAL RULE. For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
elicited from him or established by public record
during cross-examination but only if the crime (1)
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant,
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

iii

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 880488-CA
Priority No. 2

AHAB MUSTAPHA ALY,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
The Jurisdictional Statement, Statement of the Case, and
Statement of the Facts are set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief at
V, 1-7.

Appellant takes this opportunity to reply to Respondent's

argument in Point I of its brief.

Points II and III are adequately

covered in Appellant's Opening Brief.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The only case cited by the State in support of its
argument that some jurisdictions have applied Rule 609 in
determining whether the prior conviction of a State's witness should
be suppressed (People v. Woodard, 590 P.2d 391 (Cal. 1979)) is
inapplicable since the language of the statute involved in Woodard
was substantially different from the language of Rule 609.
The prior conviction of Ms. Finken should not have been
suppressed under Rule 403.

Defense counsel timely raised this issue

in the trial court and requested Instruction No. 13 in a timely
fashion.

The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as

to the use which could be made of the prior conviction and the
remaining instructions were not sufficient to adequately inform the
jury.

ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 13.
(Reply to Point I)
In its brief, the State concedes that
[i]t appears that the majority position in the
federal courts is that the process of weighing the
probative value of evidence of a prior conviction
against the prejudicial effect "to the defendant,"
places no limitation upon cross-examination of
government witnesses because of possible
prejudicial effect to them [citations omitted].
Respondent's Brief at 8.

The State then asserts that "[o]ther

jurisdictions have not followed this position" and cites People v.
Woodard, 590 P.2d 391, 396 (Cal. 1979), in support of its
assertion.

Respondent's Brief at 9.

However, Woodard fails to

support the assertion since the language of California Evidence Code
§788, the statute at issue in Woodard, is substantially different
than that of Rule 609. California Evidence Code §788 provides in
pertinent part:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness, it may be shown by the examination of the
witness or by the record of the judgment that he
has been convicted of a felony . . .
Woodard, 590 P.2d at 393.
The California rule does not contain the language "to the
defendant" and is not patterned after federal rule 609. Hence,
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whether it is applicable to witnesses for the State is irrelevant in
determining whether Utah Rules of Evidence 609 can be used to
suppress the prior convictions of a State witness.
The Woodard Court noted that "although Evidence Code
Section 788 [footnote omitted] authorizes the admission of prior
felony convictions to impeach the credibility of a witness, a trial
court must, when requested, exercise its discretion under Section
352 [footnote omitted] and exclude this evidence if the probative
value of the prior conviction is outweighed by other factors, such
as the risk of undue prejudice."

j[(3. at 393-4.

California Evidence

Code 352 provides:
The court in its discretion may exclude evidence
if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the probability that its admission will (a)
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b)
create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.
Hence, while Rule 788 apparently does not provide for a balancing
test similar to that in Utah Rules of Evidence 609, Rule 352 is
similar to Utah Rules of Evidence 403 and provides for exclusion
where the moving party can establish that the prejudicial effect of
the evidence substantially outweighs its probative value.
Furthermore, the prior conviction involved in Woodard was
that of a defense witness and not a witness for the State. Woodard
did not address the issue raised in the present case and is
inapplicable to the State's suggestion that other jurisdictions have
used Rule 609 to suppress the convictions of a government witness.
The State cites no other cases in support of this proposition.
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The State asserts that even if the prior conviction was
proper impeachment evidence, it could have been excluded under Utah
Rules of Evidence 403. Respondent's Brief at 11.

The State then

implies that the trial court ruled that the potential foe prejudice
outweighed the probative value of the conviction requiring exclusion
under Rule 403 and that the trial court's determination of the issue
"will not be disturbed on appeal unless the court so abused its
discretion that there was a substantial likelihood of an unjust
result [citations omitted]."

Respondent's Brief at 11.

Mr. Aly does not dispute that Rule 403 is applicable;
however, Mr. Aly does dispute that the court reached its decision
under Rule 403 or applied a balancing test in reaching its ruling
which requires deference on appeal.
As pointed out in Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, the
trial court seemed to confuse the two subsections of Rule 609 in
reaching its decision and relied on subsection (a)(2) and the
rationale that a conviction for distribution of controlled substance
is not a crime of dishonesty in reaching its decision that the
conviction would not have been admissible (T. 44). See Addendum B
in Appellant's Opening Brief.

In reaching its decision that it

would have excluded the prior conviction of the State's witness, the
court did not apply a balancing test under either Rule 609 or Rule
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403.!

The court stated:
I will so rule at this time that if the conviction
is one for distribution of a controlled substance,
that that is not a crime that goes to the question
of honesty or dishonesty and cannot be inquired
into.

(T. 44). The State's attempts to stretch this ruling to include
such a balancing test (Respondent's Brief at 10-11) do not comport
with the record.

See Addendum B of Appellant's Opening Brief for

entire transcript of argument and ruling.
The State suggests that Rule 609 must be made applicable
to State witnesses because otherwise the "unsettling result" of
allowing a defendant to testify without cross-examination as to his
prior convictions but requiring a State's witness to divulge his or
her convictions would occur.

Respondent's Brief at 9.

However,

such an "unsettling result" would be easily cured by an appropriate
application of Rule 403, and avoiding such a result does not require
this Court to misinterpret Rule 609.

In the situation outlined by

the State on page 9 of its brief, the prejudicial effect of the
prior conviction of the State's witness may well outweigh its
probative value where numerous convictions of the defendant are

1

While under 609(a)(1) the party that wishes to admit
the prior conviction must establish that the probative value
outweighs its prejudicial effect, thereby requiring admission, the
burden is reversed under Rule 403. Pursuant to Rule 403, the party
seeking to suppress the conviction must establish the prejudicial
effect substantially outweighs the probative value. Furthermore,
the test under Rule 609(a)(1) explicitly requires that the focus be
on the prejudice to the defendant whereas Rule 403 makes no such
requirement and allows to focus on the prejudicial impact of the
evidence to the party seeking to exclude it.

suppressed, thereby requiring exclusion of the conviction of the
government witness under Rule 403.
In the instant case, the prejudicial effect of the prior
conviction of Ms. Finken did not outweigh its probative value.
Mr. Aly did not testify and he had no prior convictions which were
suppressed.

The credibility of Ms. Finken was the primary issue in

this case, and, as outlined in Appellant's Opening Brief at 19-20,
Distribution of a Controlled Substance is a crime which reflects on
both the credibility and the reliability of a witness.

No prejudice

to Ms. Finken was argued and, in fact, the State did not object when
defense counsel elicited the response (T. 39). Furthermore, on
direct examination, Ms. Finken acknowledged that she stopped working
for Mr. Aly because she was arrested on a probation violation
(T. 35). Hence, through the direct questioning of the prosecutor,
Ms. Finken informed the jury that she had been convicted of a
crime.

Because the prejudicial effect of the conviction did not

substantially outweigh its probative value, Rule 403 did not require
exclusion of the conviction.
The State contends that Instructions Nos. 8 and 9
adequately covered the information contained in Defendant's proposed
Instruction No. 13. Respondent's Brief at 11-12.

However, as

pointed out in Appellant's Opening Brief at 26-27, while Instruction
No. 9 lists a number of factors that can be taken into account when
assessing credibility, it fails to include the prior conviction of a
witness.

The factors listed are thereby emphasized and the jury is

left with almost an implication that the prior conviction is not a
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factor to consider.
Nor does Instruction No. 8 inform the jury that it can
consider a witness1 prior conviction in assessing credibility.

That

instruction deals with the reconciliation of conflicts in the
evidence and how to proceed where the jury believes a witness
wilfully testified falsely.

It does not guide the jury as to how it

should go about assessing the credibility and reliability of a
witness.
Finally, the State contends that Defendant did not submit
the instruction in a timely fashion and cites State v. Evans, 668
P.2d 566 (Utah 1983) in support of that proposition.
Brief at 12-13.

Respondent's

In Evans, the Court recessed for almost three hours

and the trial judge informed the parties that he would be preparing
instructions during the recess.

The Defendant did not proffer the

requested instructions until the Court "was about to read the
instructions to the jury . . ."

I_d. at 567. Defense counsel had

not informed the Court earlier that he intended to submit
instructions nor asked for a continuance for the purpose of
preparing instructions.

The trial court refused to consider the

instructions.
Rule 19, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that
the parties request their instructions at the close of the evidence
or "at such earlier time as the court reasonably direct."
In the instant case, the proposed instruction was
initially requested on the first day of trial prior to the close of
evidence (T. 43-4).

Defense counsel requested that the court use
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its "stock felony conviction" instruction but was interrupted by the
prosecutor, who questioned the appropriateness of such an
instruction (T. 43). A short argument ensued, and the trial court
denied the requested instruction (T. 44). See Addendum 33,
Appellant's Opening Brief.
All of the evidence was presented on the first day of
trial.

When the court reconvened on the second day of trial, the

trial judge held a hearing outside the presence of the jury.

The

judge stated on the record:
We have met with counsel in chambers and gone over
jury instructions. The Court has put together a
set of instructions, counsel has had a chance to
review those overnight. Counsel for the defendant
presented one additional instruction this morning,
and we will give that some consideration at this
time.
(TF. 1 ) . Defense counsel then argued the appropriateness of giving
Instruction No. 13.

In reaching his decision not to give the

instruction, the trial judge reiterated that he had previously ruled
that he would have sustained an objection to the prior conviction
evidence and ruled that, under such circumstances, the proposed
instruction was not appropriate (TF. 2-3). See Addendum C in
Appellant's Opening Brief.
At no time did the trial court indicate that the
instruction was not timely, nor did he refuse to review it, as was
the case in Evans.

The procedure of reviewing and discussing the

instructions in chambers then considering the matter on the record
indicates that the instruction was requested and considered in a
timely fashion and that no party to the proceedings considered the
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matter waived.

In fact, presenting the instruction on the morning

of the second day of trial appears from the record to have been the
only appropriate time for doing so within the context of this case.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant, Ahab Mustapha Aly,
respectfully requests that his conviction be reversed and the case
remanded to the trial court for a new trial or dismissal.
Respectfully submitted this

lty~~ day of May, 1989.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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